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Abstract: 
Contemporary security challenges such as the Ukraine Crisis, the threat posed by IS, terrorist attacks 
on European soil and mass migration caused by political, economic and social upheaval have all 
raised the question of whether the European Union (EU) has an effective strategy to address these 
issues. The European Security Strategy (ESS) is the foundational strategic document for which the 
EU’s security policies and strategies are based on. But many have argued that the strategy is out-of-
date and needs to be scrapped and replaced by a new Global Strategy. However, whilst this paper 
agrees that the EU needs a global strategy, there is much in the ESS that remains as relevant today as 
it was when it came into force in 2003. Instead of scrapping it, this paper argues that the ESS needs 
to be updated, strengthened and integrated with other existing policies to make the ESS an effective 
and truly global strategy.      
 
Zusammenfassung: 
Gegenwärtige sicherheitspolitische Herausforderungen wie z.B. die Krise in der Ukraine, die 
Bedrohung durch ISIS, Terroranschläge auf europäischem Boden, oder Migrationsströme ausgelöst 
durch politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Umbrüche geben Anlass zur Frage, ob die Europäische 
Union über eine effektive Strategie zur Bewältigung dieser Sicherheitsprobleme verfügt. Die 
Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie (ESS) ist das Grundlagendokument, auf welchem die 
Sicherheitspolitik und die Sicherheitsstrategie der EU basieren. Viele argumentieren jedoch, dass 
diese Strategie nicht mehr zeitgemäß ist und durch eine neue Globale Strategie ersetzt werden 
sollte. Wenngleich hier die Meinung geteilt wird, dass es einer globalen Strategie bedarf, so wird 
gleichzeitig die Position vertreten, dass die ESS viele Elemente beinhaltet,  die heute genauso 
relevant sind wie zum Zeitpunkt ihrer Verabschiedung im Jahre 2003. Statt die ESS zur Gänze zu 
verwerfen,  lautet dementsprechend die hier vertretene These, sollte sie aktualisiert, gestärkt und 
mit anderen Elementen besser integriert werden, um sie zu einer wahrhaft globalen und effektiven 
Strategie zu machen.  
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Global Strategy and the European Union: Advancing the Debate and Updating the 
European Security Strategy 
 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) is no longer fit for purpose and is no longer effective enough to 
meet contemporary security challenges in Europe’s strategic neighbourhood!1 This seems to be the 
growing sentiment among academics and think tanks whose focus is concerned with European Union 
(EU) foreign and security policy. Contemporary security challenges such as the Ukraine Crisis and the 
fear of an increasingly belligerent Russia, the threat of ISIS, terrorist attacks on European soil and 
mass migration caused by political, social and economic upheaval have all contributed to the 
intellectual and political pandemonium, and the ever vocal calls that the EU needs to be a more 
effective security actor, that the ESS is out-of-date and therefore we need a whole new strategy to 
deal with contemporary security challenges.  
 
But moves in this direction means that the EU, its member states and various stakeholders could run 
the risk of throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. If one examines the ESS, far from 
being redundant, the strategy actually still retains a great deal of relevance, addressing many of the 
security challenges that still are as present today as they were in 2003. The solution to meeting the 
contemporary security challenges of the EU is not to scrap the ESS, but to save the existing policy by 
integrating, updating, and augmenting the existing frameworks; combing, including and 
amalgamating existing strategies and policies into one upgraded ESS that makes the best of the old 
approaches but with new frameworks to meet contemporary challenges.  
 
The EU faces a plethora of contemporary security challenges that are inter-sectoral and trans-border 
in nature. These include, inter alia, terrorism, global warming, mass migration and the financial crisis.  
They require strategies that can take this dynamic into account and have the flexibility to adapt to 
                                                          
1 Howorth, J. Security and Defence Policy In The European Union (Basingstoke, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); 
Dennison, S. Gowan, R. Kundnani, H. Leonard, M and Witney, N. ‘Why Europe Needs A New Global Strategy’ 
(European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR, October 2013). Available at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR90_STRATEGY_BRIEF_AW.pdf (Accessed 4 January 2015); Biscop, S. ‘A New External Action Service Needs 
a New European Security Strategy’ (EGMONT, Royal Institute for International Relations, No 29, November 
2011). Available at http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/SPB29-New-ESS.pdf 
(Accessed 3 January 2015); Biscop, S. ‘EU Grand Strategy: Optimism is Mandatory’ (EGMONT, Royal Institute for 
International Relations, No 36, July 2012). Available at http://www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/SPB36-Biscop.pdf  (Accessed 3 January 2015); Lundin, L. ‘From a European Security 
Strategy to a European Global Strategy: Take II: Policy options’, UI Occasional Papers (The Swedish Institute of 
International Affairs, No 13, 2012). Available at  
http://www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu/nyheter/publications/from-a-european-security-strategy-to-a-
european-global-strategy-take-ii-policy-options (Accessed 5 January 2015).    
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new and ever changing geopolitical security environments. Considering these factors the most logical 
type of strategy has to be a Global Strategy as this facilitates the maximum inclusion of stakeholders, 
sectors and levels of security. This, it is argued, should be the approach of a new revamped ESS. 
 
The ESS: Unfit for Purpose or Just in Need of a Makeover? 
 
In October 2013 the ECFR published a policy brief in which it stated that the ESS ‘has now outlasted 
its usefulness: many of the approaches that worked so well for Europe in the immediate aftermath of 
the Cold War seem to be ineffectual at best and counter-productive at worst in an age of power 
transition and global political awakening’.2 The ESS was adopted in 2003 and provided the strategic 
bedrock and guiding principles for the EU’s foreign and security strategy and subsequent policies, 
namely the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP). As has been expounded on in ‘Why Europe Needs a New Global Strategy’, the strategy was 
designed for a different time. The crisis in the euro has undermined the EU’s institutions, Iraq and 
Afghanistan have discredited liberal interventionism, and the rise of China and other emerging 
economies are undermining Europe’s power.3  
 
The opening paragraph of the introduction of the ESS is frequently quoted by many who wish to 
show the apparent superannuated nature of the strategy. 
‘Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th 
Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history’.4 
 
This may indeed be heavily laden with the language and spirit of the immediate post-Cold War era, 
but taking this first statement as proof that the entire strategy is antiquated could be interpreted as 
taking a cheap shot at the strategy. Deliberately shining a spot light on what is supposed to be an 
inspirational sentiment, and merely a colourful use of language, in order to give an inspirational 
quality to an official bureaucratic document does smack of desperation. Those who quote this to 
validate their point seem to miss the point. The opening statement may indeed reflect a different 
time, but much in the strategy still remains valid. 
                                                          
2 Dennison, S. Gowan, R. Kundnani, H. Leonard, M and Witney, N. ‘Why Europe Needs A New Global Strategy’ 
(European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR, October 2013). Available at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR90_STRATEGY_BRIEF_AW.pdf (Accessed 4 January 2015), p. 2.  
3 ibid., p. 2. 
4 European Union (EU), ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy’ (Brussels, 12 December 
2003). Available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (Accessed 14 December 
2014). p.1. 
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It is a mistake to think that the EU has not tried to develop comprehensive or inter-sectoral security 
strategies. The ESS itself recognises that ‘globalisation has also made threats more complex and 
interconnected’,5 and how ‘the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked’.6 
Other initiatives such as the construction of the Comprehensive Approach in crisis management 
operations, which has not been finalised due to differences within the EU, will have to be 
incorporated within an updated ESS. The 2014 Energy Security Strategy and the Maritime Security 
Strategy,7 whilst accommodating greater inter-sectoral and multidimensional approaches, are heavily 
focused on some areas at the expense of others and still lack true comprehensiveness. These 
strategies must also be incorporated within the framework of an updated ESS, as well as the EU’s 
Internal Security Strategy (ISS).          
 
However, despite recent strategies the ESS itself is out-of-date, and is so because evolving geopolitics 
has changed the global security environment, and the strategy has not adapted to these shifts. A 
strategy that cannot adapt to emerging and evolving security challenges is no longer effective and 
constrains the ability of the stakeholder as an effective global security actor. The 2014 Energy and 
Maritime security strategies are, in effect, a symptom of the lack of comprehensiveness in the ESS. 
Sectoral approaches do have their uses and can be quite an efficacious approach; however, sector 
specific strategies seem to lack an ability to plan in the long term and are more reactive in their 
nature.8 By compartmentalising the problem into a specific sector the strategist cannot foresee the 
emergence of other problems in other sectors. Analysis, therefore, has to be freed up in order to 
successfully account for the fluidity of security challenges to be present in multiple sectors and move 
through different levels of analysis; An approach that must be used within an updated ESS.  
                                                          
5 European Union (EU), ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security 
for a Changing World’, (S407/08), (Brussels, 11 December 2008). Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf (Accessed 14 
December 2014). p.1. 
6 European Union (EU), ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy’ (Brussels, 12 December 
2003). Available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (Accessed 14 December 
2014). p.2.  
7 European Union (EU), Council of the European Union, ‘European Union Maritime Security Strategy’ (Brussels, 
24 June 2014). Available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT 
(Accessed 12 February 2015); European Union (EU), European Commission, ‘Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council’, ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ (Brussels, 28 
May 2014). Available at 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN (Accessed 12 
February 2015). 
8 Fägersten, B. ‘How Grand is Global? Notes on a European Strategy’, UI brief (The Swedish Institute of 
 International Affairs, No 14, 9 October 2012). Available at 
http://www.euglobalstrategy.eu/tools/News/PageArchive?p=6  (Accessed 10 January 2015), p. 5. 
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It is a far more prudent approach to update the existing strategy instead of scrapping it and starting 
from scratch for a number of reasons many of which lie in the fact that a brand new strategy is likely 
to cause severe organisational headaches and ideological confrontation. One of the main reasons 
why it is a good idea to avoid a totally new strategy is of the practical realisation that getting a pan-
EU agreement is going to be immensely difficult. The reason why, is one of strategic perspectives.            
 “The 28 member states don’t share the same perceptions of threats and don’t share the same means 
with which to respond to such threats”. (Vivien Pertusot of the French Institute of International 
Relations in an interview with Euronews).9    
 
In the context of a global strategy perspective, projects such as the European Global Strategy (EGS) 
project and Notre Europe’s ‘Think Global – Act European IV’ project emerged out of concern for the 
state of the EU’s security strategy and the union’s ability to perform as a legitimate security actor. 
The EGS set out a series of new strategic priorities,10 whilst Notre Europe’s project puts forward 10 
key recommendations to strengthen the EU globally.11 Yet neither document mentions the ESS at all, 
and it is in so doing that they reveal their point of view. Namely, that the ESS should be scrapped and 
replaced by an overarching Global Strategy. The EGS proposal may say it wants to adapt the EU’s 
existing toolbox regarding instruments and capabilities,12 but fundamentally they want to replace the 
ESS with a new strategy. The Notre Europe proposal on the other hand says the EU’s tools are 
ineffective or that they need new ones. Regardless, both want to scrap the ESS. This approach, 
however, is a bad strategy and one that will invite political stalemate and member states pitching 
their ideologies and their perceptions of security against one another. This can be observed in recent 
efforts to improve security mechanisms.     
 
The ECFR expressed their frustration when noting that the European Council of December 2013 
didn’t produce any extensive military cooperation plans. ‘Military cooperation proposals were 
conspicuously absent. And it is here that European defence is most damagingly falling short of its 
                                                          
9 “Defence Experts Cool on Juncker’s EU Army Scheme,” Euronews, accessed March 18, 2015, 
http://www.euronews.com/2015/03/09/defence-experts-cool-on-juncker-s-eu-army-scheme/. 
10 European Global Strategy (EGS),’ Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a 
Changing World’, (28 May 2013). Available at http://www.euglobalstrategy.eu/  (Accessed 11 December 2014). 
pp. 8-17.  
11Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, ‘Think Global – Act European IV: Thinking Strategically about the 
EU’s External Action’ (Paris: Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, April 2013). Available at 
http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/tgae2013.pdf?pdf=ok (Accessed 15 December 2014).   
12 European Global Strategy (EGS),’ Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a 
Changing World’, (28 May 2013). Available at http://www.euglobalstrategy.eu/  (Accessed 11 December 2014). 
p. 5. 
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potential, and its declared ambition’.13 Instead the conclusions drawn at the summit focused on 
increasing the potential for pooling and sharing, creating the framework for a cyber defence policy, 
drafting a Maritime Security Strategy by 2014, and on improving and developing the defence 
infrastructure. 14 The emphasis on ‘pooling and sharing’ may be an example of the influence of the 
politics of austerity in defence budgets and domestic politics rather than the result of a prudent 
restructuring of security strategy, but the apparent immovability is also an expression of the fact that 
member states fundamentally operate on different perceptions of security. It is not that the ESS 
doesn’t need reform; rather it is that any attempt to just throw away what has already been 
developed is likely to encourage disagreement and entrenched positions rather than serious debate.  
The EU has a security strategy, and furthermore it still addresses many issues that are relevant today. 
The key threats identified of Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Regional 
Conflicts, State Failure and Organised Crime are as relevant today as they were in 2003: Especially if 
one considers current challenges such as the threat of ISIS and Al-Qaida, The state failure in Libya, 
the ongoing crisis in Somalia, the DRC and Sub Saharan Africa, and organised criminal gangs 
smuggling migrants across the Mediterranean. The ESS is out-of-date but not useless, it is not an 
issue of relevance it is fundamentally an issue of comprehensiveness. Much of what is discussed by 
the EGS, Notre Europe and the ECFR is very relevant, especially on their outlines of what needs to be 
included, but the approach is wrong. Rather than starting the whole process from scratch, the EU 
already has a strategic document to base their negotiations on; a document which each of the 28 
member states already agrees upon, and this is a solid foundation with which to begin the process of 
updating the strategy. By focusing on updating instead of eradicating and remaking, the EU will avoid 
the organisational headaches that would come from trying to forge an all new strategy; headaches 
which the EU does not need right now. Updating will also mean less ideological confrontation 
between member states over the nature of European security if the starting point for reform is built 
on policy they have already agreed upon. This is also preferable because the EU needs to show as 
much of a united front as possible, especially between its member states. Updating is much more 
cost effective in terms of time and energy, and with pressure mounting from various security 
challenges, the EU must update its strategy quickly.       
 
                                                          
13 Witney, N. ‘Despite the Brits, a modest defence summit success’, European Council on Foreign Relations,  
ECFR’s blog, (22 December 2013). Available at 
 http://www.ecfr.eu/blog/entry/despite_the_brits_a_modest_defence_summit_success (Accessed 5 April 
2015).     
14 European Council, ‘European Council, 19/20 December 2013, Conclusions’ (Brussels: European Council, 20 
December 2013).  
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The announcement at the informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers on 18th February this year in 
Riga stated that,                    
 ‘The Ministers agreed that Heads of States and Government will need to address current security and 
defence concerns and open a revision of the European Security Strategy.’15 
 
The idea of reforming the ESS is now being circulated at the level of member states and EU governing 
bodies. This, therefore, is the perfect opportunity to reignite the academic debates on the European 
Security Strategy. It is unlikely that the European Council meeting in June will deliver a brand new 
ESS, but it will begin the process of reconsidering the EU’s approach, and the member states already 
have a basis on which to start. The ESS does need to be updated and made more comprehensive and 
adaptable, but rather than trying to formulate a whole new strategy it is a wiser idea to take the ESS, 
keep what is relevant, and transform it into a European Global Security Strategy.     
 
Expounding Global Strategy 
 
Global strategy is developing a greater, more expansive literature which is branching into many areas 
of study. Within the context of EU foreign and security policy this has meant an expansive approach 
to security issues away from the traditional military/ state-centric approaches to security challenges 
and a broadening of the referent objects. This is clearly illustrated within the contemporary debates 
on European global strategy. The EGS, Notre Europe and publications by the ECFR all include a 
greater focus away from traditional military security and member state security to more inclusive 
and broader interpretations of security such as economic security, development, energy security and 
human development. These ideas and proposals reflect a multi-sectoral approach with a departure 
toward newer perspectives of referent objects, an approach that can be found in Security Studies 
within the Copenhagen School. 
 
The Copenhagen School: Facilitating Global Strategy Formulation 
 
In their landmark text ‘Security: A New Framework For Analysis’ Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 
approach the traditionalist approaches to security by adopting a multi-sectoral, multi-level approach 
                                                          
15 European Union External Action Service (EEAS), Security and Defence on the agenda at Riga Informal 
Meeting. Available from:  
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2015/190215_eu_defence_ministers_in_riga_en.htm (Accessed 19 March 
2015). 
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that uses a constructivist approach in order to analyse how the perceived threats to certain referent 
objects have been constructed by the process of securitization. 16 This approach allows for a far 
greater inclusion of stakeholders, levels and sectors without losing coherence and represents a 
foundation text for the wideners in the Traditionalist versus Wideners debate in Security Studies. It 
also represents the most practical theory to apply in the formulation of global strategies. 
 
Global strategies by their nature also have to distinguish themselves as multi-sectoral, 
accommodating a greater range of sectors that expands away from the traditionalist military/ state-
centric based approaches. This can be seen in the contemporary debates surrounding the formation 
of a new European foreign and security policy.17 The Copenhagen School, with its widening approach, 
therefore represents the best theory to use in the formulation of global strategies. It is important for 
a global strategy to be truly comprehensive, allowing for the inclusion of multiple stakeholders, levels 
of analysis and sectors in order to deal with a security challenge effectively thus mitigating the worst 
effects or preventing a security challenge from becoming a much larger problem. By tackling the 
security challenge in a comprehensive manner the worst of the effects can be prevented thus 
reducing costs for a stakeholder to deal with the problem.   
 
For these reasons the Copenhagen School represents the best approach to use in the formulation of 
global strategies. Therefore, the approach of the Copenhagen School must be used and enshrined in 
the global strategy formulation processes of the EU in the creation of an updated ESS, and indeed be 
the foundation theory of the ESS.    
 
The ESS: What to Keep and What to Remove 
 
The ESS desperately needs to be updated, but there are many good aspects to be kept from the 
strategy. All five identified key threats of Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Regional Conflicts, State Failure and Organised Crime remain highly relevant and must be kept in and 
                                                          
16 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998). 
17 European Global Strategy (EGS),’ Towards a European Global Strategy: Securing European Influence in a 
Changing World’, (28 May 2013). Available at http://www.euglobalstrategy.eu/  (Accessed 11 December 2014); 
Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, ‘Think Global – Act European IV: Thinking Strategically about the EU’s 
External Action’ (Paris: Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, April 2013). Available at http://www.notre-
europe.eu/media/tgae2013.pdf?pdf=ok (Accessed 15 December 2014); Dennison, S. Gowan, R. Kundnani, H. 
Leonard, M and Witney, N. ‘Why Europe Needs A New Global Strategy’ (European Council on Foreign Relations, 
ECFR, October 2013). Available at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR90_STRATEGY_BRIEF_AW.pdf (Accessed 4 
January 2015).   
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will form the basis for the addition of new threats. The problem in the ESS essentially lies in the 
limited number of identified threats, but also in the weak and vague ‘Strategic Objectives’ of the 
strategy. These were divided into Addressing the Threats, Building Security in our Neighbourhood, 
and An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism. The general theme of these objectives 
is to increase cooperation with countries and regions in the EU’s strategic neighbourhood, 
reinforcing international institutions, building consensus and agreement on various issues, engaging 
with and strengthening the EU’s strategic neighbourhood and reinforcing cooperation within the EU 
on pan-European issues like terrorism and coordinating and combing efforts. 
 
These aspects are all relevant, but what are lacking are in-depth detailed specifics. It mentions 
partners and key countries and institutions to engage with, and talks about using diplomacy, trade 
etc to achieve goals and does mention specific problems and that they need resolving. But crucially 
the lack of detailed specifics is one of the underlying weaknesses of the strategy. The limited number 
of identified security threats also hampers the strategy. The overall strategy is vague. Some might 
argue that it needed to be vague to provide a general basis for future strategic planning, but without 
in depth detailed specifics it is less of a strategy and more of a general ‘to-do’ list. The 2008 review, 
which represents the one and only time the strategy was reviewed, essentially stated that the ESS 
was valid, but more needs to be done. It did, however, raise additional emphasis on the need to 
address cyber security, energy security and climate change, mentioning them specifically in the text. 
To update the ESS, the highlighted key threats must be kept and the extra areas highlighted in the 
2008 review must be incorporated. From here the ESS can be updated by expanding the range of 
potential threats and to include detailed and precise strategies within it on a per stakeholder, per 
threat and sub-threat basis to create a comprehensive security strategy.       
 
Policy Recommendations 
 
There is a great deal of truth in the statement that ‘Europeans seem to be losing power and influence 
in the world at a startling speed.’18 However, instead of scrapping the ESS it should be updated, 
consolidated and strengthened; saving the relevant parts and incorporating it with other existing 
policies and strategies, and then adding further frameworks will make the ESS effective and relevant 
                                                          
18 Dennison, S. Gowan, R. Kundnani, H. Leonard, M and Witney, N. ‘Why Europe Needs A New Global Strategy’ 
(European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR, October 2013). Available at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR90_STRATEGY_BRIEF_AW.pdf (Accessed 4 January 2015), p. 2. 
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again. In addition to the suggestions made of what to keep and what to remove from the ESS, it is 
recommended that the following policies be implemented to review and update the strategy.  
 
Recommendations to the European Commission and the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) 
 
 To establish a committee, jointly run by the Commission and the EEAS, to access and collect 
data on the security priorities, perspectives of security and the referent objects that need 
securing of every member state. This data once collected will be used to map and identify 
potential areas of conflict in the negotiations to update the ESS. 
 
  The Commission and the EEAS will coordinate with each member state on each other’s 
strategic priorities and referent objects. This must be done before any formal meeting to 
allow time for negotiation. This will enable each member state to regard every other 
member states’ priorities and allow for negotiations to avoid stagnation and conflict at the 
official review stages of the strategy.    
 
 Establish an inter-departmental/ inter-institutional committee to review the ESS with the 
idea of formulating potential draft proposals to the member states, their respective 
ministries and the European Parliament. This is in order to avoid conflict at official meetings 
for the review of the ESS. NB: This same committee will at a later date be responsible for the 
entire coordination process between EU institutions and member states before, during and 
after official meetings on the reform of the ESS. 
 
 The aforementioned committee will also be responsible for the following tasks: 
o To review the other security strategies and to assess how they can be integrated into 
a comprehensive strategy.  
o This committee will also review and assess potential inter-departmental/ inter-
institutional conflict at the EU level. This is in order to streamline internal relations 
within the EU structure. 
 
 After the new updated ESS has been agreed upon, and in order to ensure regular updating of 
the strategy, a new committee will be established to review the strategy every 5 years to 
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member states and institutions on whether further updates need to be implemented. A 
report will be issued every year to ensure continuity. 
o Within this committee there will be two secondary task forces. One shall focus on 
current global security threats and situations around the world and analyse their 
impact on the EU and asses potential action. The second will concentrate on 
potential and future security threats and will concentrate on crisis simulation and 
scenario building.  
 
 A group consisting of academic institutions and think tanks should be established to 
continually asses the EU’s security strategy. This group and the aforementioned committee 
will meet once a year to assess the current and potential future challenges facing the EU and 
report their findings in a yearly report to all relevant stakeholders. 
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